Neil Levy
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See citations webpage: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=hqLeZWcAAAAJ&hl=en
I graduated from Monash University, Australia, with a PhD in continental philosophy in 1995; I qualified for a second PhD (on the metaphysics of free will) in 2006. From 2002 to 2009 I was a research fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne; from 2006, I combined that position with a part-time role at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. From 2010, I was head of neuroethics at the Florey Institutes of Neuroscience in Melbourne. Since 2015, I have been professor of philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, while continuing my role at the Uehiro Centre.
Levy, N. Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People. Oxford University Press (under contract). |
Levy, N. Forthcoming. 'Virtue Signalling is Virtuous'. Synthese. |
Levy, N. Forthcoming. 'The Surprising Truth about Disagreement'. Acta Analytica. |
Levy, N. Forthcoming. 'Suspiciously Convenient Belief'. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. |
Levy, N. & Savulescu, J. Forthcoming. 'Epistemic Responsibility in the Face of a Pandemic'. Journal of Law and the Biosciences. |
Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Crone, D., Everett, J., Earp, B., & Levy, N. Forthcoming. 'Does encouraging a belief in determinism increase cheating? Reconsidering the value of believing in free will'. Cognition. |
Levy, N. & Alfano, M. 2020. 'Knowledge from vice: Deeply social epistemology'. Mind 129: 887-915 |
Levy, N. 2020. 'Rationalization is rational'. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43: 28-9. |
Levy, N. 2020. 'Belie the Belief'. Religion, Brain & Behavior 10: 35-48. |
Levy, N. 2019. 'No Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming'. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5: 487-502 |
Crone, D. & Levy, N. 2019. 'Are free will believers nicer people? (Four studies suggest not)'. Social Psychological and Personality Science 10: 612-9. |
Levy, N. 2019. 'Applying Brown and Savulescu: The Diachronic Condition as Excuse'. Journal of Medical Ethics 45: 646-7 |
Levy, N. 2019. 'Putting the Luck Back Into Moral Luck'. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43: 59-74. |
Levy, N. 2019. 'Taking responsibility for responsibility'. Public Health Ethics 12: 103-113 |
Levy, N. 2019. 'Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Nudging is Giving Reasons'. Ergo 6(10). http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.010 |
Australian Brain Alliance 2019. 'A Neuroethics Framework For The Australian Brain Initiative'. Neuron 101: 365-369. |
Levy, N. 2019. 'Due Deference to Denialism: Explaining Ordinary People's Rejection of Established Scientific Findings'. Synthese 196: 313-327. |
I am a wide-ranging philosopher, working principally at the intersection of philosophy of mind and psychology and ethics. I also have serious research interests in free will, moral responsibility, epistemology, and applied ethics.