Philosophy of Mind Visiting Speakers Seminar (Friday - Week 5, HT21)

Naïve realism claims that the phenomenal character of perception is constituted by particular objects. This is often believed to imply that experiences of numerically distinct particulars can in no circumstances share the same phenomenal character. Many see this implication is unacceptable, because the phenomenal character is thought to have a certain degree of generality. Recent attempts to accommodate the generality of experience are based on introducing two levels or notions of phenomenal character, one that is particular-involving, and one that has generality. I will argue that bifurcating the phenomenal character is unnecessary and unmotivated and will offer an alternative strategy to accommodate the generality of experience. This will involve adopting a relational account of phenomenal character, which identifies it with the obtaining of the relation of having a point of view on a scene.
 

People wishing to attend, will need to email Mike Martin, and will be sent a link for the meeting by the Thursday morning: the sessions will be secure, and each person who joins will need to be admitted to the session. So contacting Mike Martin ahead of time will be essential.