I did my undergraduate degree at Heythrop College, University of London (2005--08); an MPhil at UCL (2008--10); and a PhD at the University of Warwick (2012--16), all in Philosophy. I came to Oxford in 2017 where I've held a number of teaching posts with Jesus College, St Catherine's College, and the Faculty of Philosophy.
Cunningham, J.J. (Forthcoming) 'The Basis of Debasing Scepticism'. Erkenntnis.
2020
'Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons'. Erkenntnis 85(3): 673--692
2019
'Is Believing for a Normative Reason a Composite Condition?' Synthese 196(9): 3889--3910
2019
'The Formulation of Disjunctivism about Phi-ing for a Reason'. Philosophy Quarterly 69(275): 235--257
2018
'Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception?' In: Gersel, Thaning, Overgaard, and Jensen (eds.) In the Light of Experience: Essays on Reasons and Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
This year (2020--21) at Oxford I'm providing the FHS Ethics: Metaethics lectures during the Hilary Term; offering supervision to BPhil students in my areas of research specialism; and providing tutorial teaching to undergraduates in General Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, Knowledge and Reality, and Early Modern Philosophy.
I specialise in Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, and Epistemology. More specifically, I'm interested in how to account for our capacity to respond correctly to reasons: an issue at the intersection of those three branches of Philosophy. In published work I've defended and developed a disjunctive approach to this phenomenon. At the moment, I'm exploring what pay-offs this approach has for the theories of rationality, responsibility, and normative achievement.
